limits. You have a proposition here that will allow two more terms, 12 years. That is going to be extremely difficult to get passed. It has taken 49 years to get another vote on it as it is.

So we say, let us have something reasonable, regardless of the past. The system has served us pretty well in the past. We balanced the budget up to 1967. Let us concentrate on the future—another 12 years. But opponents of term limits say, no, that is not good enough. Let us fashion something that we know is impossible of getting passed, like making it retroactive. That will be consistent. That will be nonhypocritical.

Perfection should not be the enemy of the good. The strategy is obvious on its face. The opponents of term limits are not interested in what they would call real term limits or genuine term limits. The opponents of term limits are interested in deflecting the debate from the future of this Nation onto individual Members and saying you cannot vote for term limits because you think that now we have dug ourselves into this hopeless ditch of debt, that you cannot vote for term limits for the future knowing it would be a few years before the ratification process would even have an opportunity to be completed. Then you have another 12 years. You cannot vote for that because you would be accused of being a hypocrite because you have been here for a while.

That is a part of the "me" generation, Mr. President. We criticize our kids for a lot of things and ourselves as part of the "me" generation—me, me, me, self-centered. The same thing is true with this body—totally, totally consumed with ourselves as individuals and how things will affect us.

Senator Jones here, we would have lost the benefit of his services if we had term limits. Well, there are millions of Mr. Joneses out there who might be Senator Joneses who might be better than Senator Jones. We have 250 million people in this country, and I do not even know what fraction of 1 percent have ever served in this body.

Are we so self-centered and conceited and blinded that we think that this fraction of 1 percent are the only people qualified because we spent a few years up here spending other people's money and regulating other people's lives that we have the only expertise in America that qualifies us to sit here?

Let us, as we go forward with this debate next week, not personalize this thing. Let us not personalize this debate. Let us not accuse people of being hypocrites. Let us not concentrate on the past. You can make an argument that in the past we did not need this. We fought two world wars, we went through a Great Depression, and we were always able to come back and balance the budget in short order. We balanced the budget up until 1969.

Recently things have gotten out of hand with the growth of Government and the growth of spending, the proliferation of interest groups and the pressures on this body, of the desire for constant reelection, never having the will to say no to anybody, but always wanting to say, "Yes, you can have this. We can increase this program at 10 percent a year because we want your vote and we want your financial support and we want this system of professional politicians that we have always had."

It has gotten us into a quagmire that our kids will find it hopeless to dig themselves out of. We are bankrupting this country in short order. We all know it, and it constitutes criminal negligence if we do not do what we can about it.

I have heard many, many times, and I heard again today, "We have term limits; we have term limits, they are called elections." If you want to call the present system term limits, you are going to have to convince me that people have a decent shot at getting what they want from the present system, what they demand.

If you are talking about electoral politics, unless you are an incumbent, you are not going to have access to the money to even run. We have millions of citizens out there who would like to serve and have the opportunity to serve, but they know, with all of the advantages of incumbency and all of the money that incumbency brings in terms of contributions, why bother? Why bother?

They say, "Well, there is a lot of turnover." That is for various reasons. Some people want to run for other offices; some people leave town one step ahead of the sheriff; some people want to go back and live in the real world. There are a lot of reasons for that. But the fact of the matter is, of those who want to stay, of those who run for reelection, about 90 percent still get reelected in the middle of all this turnover.

So, the question is not what the turnover rate is. It goes up and down. The question is, What is the motivation of the overwhelming majority of the people who serve? If they ultimately decide to leave for whatever reason, or even maybe within their term for whatever reason, that still does not answer the question, what was their motivation while they were there?

I firmly believe that if that motivation is, in large part, not totally, but in large part, simply staying and getting reelected and doing the things necessary to stay in office year in and year out, because the longer you stay the less touch you have with the real world and, in some cases, the less you feel like you will be able to do, and then age catches up with you perhaps and you become more and more desperate to stay and you are willing to do more and more things to stay—what is the motivation of those kind of people?

The motivation of those kind of people to point out that "We cannot increase your program, madam, at 10 percent this year. We maybe could increase it 6 or 7 percent. But your check

might be a little less than what you were expecting it to be from the Federal Government." That is dangerous. That is dangerous, and we need people in this body who are willing to risk a little danger. That is what we do not have, and that is what this is all about.

So as I say, next week we can get back on the central issue here: What is best going to equip this country to meet the challenges of the next century—as we, as sure as I am standing here, are bankrupting this country—not how it affects some individual Members. We will be lucky if we are remembered 24 hours after we leave. It does not have to do with that.

So with that, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMPSON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk relating to the committee substitute to Senate Joint Resolution 21.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the committee substitute to Calendar No. 201, Senate Joint Resolution 21, a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to limit Congressional terms:

Bob Dole, Fred Thompson, Spencer Abraham, Rod Grams, Mike DeWine, John Ashcroft, Craig Thomas, Jon Kyl, Trent Lott, John McCain, Slade Gorton, Rick Santorum, Bill Frist, Larry E. Craig, Paul Coverdell, Lauch Faircloth.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the cloture vote occur at 2:15 p.m. on Tuesday, April 23, and the mandatory quorum under rule XXII be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I now ask that there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, not to extend beyond 4 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business Thursday, April 18, 1996, the Federal debt stood at \$5.099,448,998,247.15.

On a per capita basis, every man, woman, and child in America owes

\$19,267.75 as his or her share of that debt.

TRADE WITH JAPAN

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, as the chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I come to the floor today to discuss briefly an issue that causes me some concern.

I see from press reports and statements released by the White House that during his recent visit to Japan, President Clinton touted his successes vis-a-vis trade with Japan, claiming that his administration has steered that trade relationship in the most positive direction in years. These statements follow others President Clinton made last week stating that recent increases in automobile and automotive parts exported to Japan are the result of an auto trade agreement his administration signed with Japan last August.

Now, you'd think that after two recent articles in the Journal of Commerce and the Washington Post—entitled respectively "More Auto Exports to Japan: Who Gets the Credit?" and "Clinton Claims on Auto Trade Disputed"—the President would have thought twice about taking credit for something that's going on anyway. Since the articles speak for themselves, I would ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follow:

MOVE AUTO EXPORTS TO JAPAN: WHO GETS THE CREDIT?

(By John Maggs)

WASHINGTON.—The closer one looks at the upturn in U.S. automotive exports to Japan, the tougher it gets to lay all the credit at the feet of President Clinton and his top trade negotiator Mickey Kantor.

President Clinton is expected to trumpet those trade results in a White House event today marking the first six months since last year's landmark U.S. Japan auto trade pact.

Claiming credit for that agreement is a small but significant piece of Mr. Clinton's re-election strategy, in which he will argue that his "free and fair" trade policy has created thousands of U.S. jobs.

As the center of that strategy, the Japan agreement mandates some of the biggest reforms Japan has ever undertaken to loosen formal and informal barriers to imports.

U.S. officials cite numerous regulatory changes they expect to yield results in additional imports. The trickier part is making the connection between these reforms and the statistics on auto trade that Mr. Clinton is expected to cite today.

The numbers are impressive. Exports to Japan by American and Japanese-owned auto factories in the United States were up 50% in 1995, and exports by Ford, Chrysler and General Motors alone are up 36% in the first two months of 1996.

U.S. auto parts exports to Japan—the real focus of the trade agreement—seem to be increasing steadily, although the rise in 1995 was smaller than the year before.

The U.S. parts-content of cars made at Japanse-owned "transplant" factories in the United States, meanwhile, increased 14% in 1995

The problem is the sheer number of factors affecting the huge U.S.-Japan auto trade, including currency shifts—which made U.S. products much more competitive in 1995—and the lead time to design parts into Japanese models, a factor that makes higher import part levels more likely after 1998.

Among replacement parts, there is very encouraging anecdotal evidence of new retail outlets opening in Japan that will carry U.S. parts, but little evidence that this has yet had a trade effect.

Mr. Clinton will note that auto parts exports to Japan have increased 60% since 1992 but the growth rate is slowing.

CLINTON CLAIMS ON AUTO TRADE DISPUTED (By Paul Blustein)

The hoopla is scheduled to start around 2 p.m. today at the White House. President Clinton will be there, as will representatives of the Big Three U.S. auto companies and the United Auto Workers. Three new American cars will be on display, with the steering wheels on the right-hand side—made to order for the Japanese market.

The purpose? To celebrate rising automobile and parts sales to Japan and make the claim—which critics call hype—that a major cause was an auto trade agreement that the administration negotiated with Tokyo last year.

The White House has marshaled some impressive-sounding statistics to make the accord look like a job-generating winner. An administration report due to be released today will highlight the fact that in the six months after the pact was signed last August, sales of U.S.-made General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co. and Chrysler Corp. vehicles in Japan rose 33 percent over the same period a year earlier, according to people familiar with the report.

It also trumpets higher sales of U.S. auto parts to Japanese companies, citing an anticipated increase of 14 percent in the North American content of 1996 model vehicles at Japanese factories on this side of the Pacific.

But many experts question whether such recent increases can be attributed to an agreement reached just a few months ago. While the administration can reasonably claim it created new business opportunities in Japan's repair parts market, they say, most of the latest surge in sales of automotive products is part of a longer-term trend stemming from prior trade deals, the weakness of the U.S. dollar and other factors.

It's "a notable achievement" that U.S. auto parts are making inroads in Japan, said Marcus Noland, a Japan expert at the Institute for International Economics and former senior economist at Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers. But "the administration is probably taking credit for something that's going on anyway." Other skeptics note that sales in Japan of European carmakers like AB Volvo and Volkswagen AG have risen at roughly the same sizzling pace over the past few months as those of the Big Three—without the benefit of a trade deal.

The upbeat nature of today's event will set the tone for Clinton's trip to Tokyo next week, which is shaping up as one of the friendliest U.S.-Japan summits in years as the two sides concentrate on shoring up their security alliance. While Clinton is expected to raise simmering trade disputes over film, computer chips and insurance, the administration is planning to try to focus attention on successes in other trade areas.

U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor is fond of pointing out that U.S. exports to Japan soared 20 percent last year, to \$64 billion, yielding the first decline since 1990 in the U.S.-Japan trade gap. But many econo-

mists ascribe Japan's rising appetite for foreign goods to the strength of the yen, which makes foreign goods cheaper to Japanesse buyers, and market-opening measures adopted long ago, rather than to the 20 U.S.-Japan trade deals struck during the Clinton era.

But in an election year, the White House is eager to claim that its aggressive trade diplomacy is producing results. That's particularly true for the auto pact, which came after a high-stakes confrontation.

On one score, the accord has clearly helped generate business for U.S. firms. Tokyo's loosening of its rules concerning the parts used in required periodic auto repairs enabled Tenneco Automotive, among others, to strike a lucrative deal for distribution of its Monroe shock absorbers in Japan.

But can the administration claim that it is responsible for the sizable rise in sales of cars and components to Japanese consumers and factories? "Whatever success you see today, the seeds were planted for that many years earlier," said a Bush administration trade official, who noted that Japanese auto companies typically choose their parts suppliers several years before a car model is produced.

Moreover, the pact has fallen short of administration hopes in one area—agreements by Japanese auto dealers to sell U.S. cars. When the deal was signed, Washington declared (without Tokyo's concurrence) that over the remainder of this decade, 200 dealers a year should sign up with GM, Ford or Chrysler. Only 30 have done so in the months since the accord was struck, although sources said yesterday that Chrysler may soon announce a deal for 60 or 70 more.

Mr. THOMAS. While I would agree that our Trade Representative Mickey Kantor has done an impressive job, not only in negotiations with Japan but with other countries as well, most notably China, but I would also agree with the vast majority of economic analysts who believe that most of the improving climate for American cars in Japan is due to natural market forces. For example, over the last year or so the yen has grown stronger compared with the dollar, making American goods cheaper in Japan. Matsushita Noriyuki, a senior economic analyst at the Nikko Research Centre, attributes increased sales of U.S. cars in his country primarily to the fact that the price of those cars has decreased. In addition, Matsushita points to major changes made by American car manufacturers to accommodate Japanese tastes and habits-such as increased attention to quality, right-hand steering wheels, and smaller model sizes—as a major factor in increased sales. More importantly, trade agreements struck before Mr. Clinton took office-under Republican administrations—are finally bearing fruit.

Mr. President, since 1992 we've grown used to a Clinton foreign policy that is an oxymoron, to a foreign policy that is reactive rather than proactive. We've grown used to a wide credibility gap between what Governor Clinton said as a candidate and what his actions are as President—I've spoken before on this floor about the irony of a President who accused George Bush of coddling China now doing more coddling of that country than President Bush could ever have been accused of.